From Response to Preparedness: What Communities Need for Safe Water Supply During Crises

From National Preparedness to Local Action

National regulations and emergency protocols establish a overarching framework for responding to water crises, but they do not automatically guarantee local operational readiness. A community’s ability to mitigate public health risks depends directly on how effectively roles, response workflows, and communication channels are defined in advance.

"The existence of policy documents and crisis plans does not mean a specific community is ready to respond," noted Tetiana Orabina, Deputy Director General of the Public Health Center of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine. "While the national government provides the legislative framework and regional bodies manage inter-agency coordination, an emergency always unfolds locally. The health of the population depends entirely on coordinated local action, proper tools, and individual readiness."

According to Orabina, community preparedness must be regularly tested in practice: evaluating whether risks are clearly understood, response workflows are operational, and residents know where to access reliable information. In a crisis, the public needs immediate answers to three fundamental questions: "What should I do?", "Where can I get safe water?", and "When will the next update be provided?"

The "Security Scenarios: Safe Water = Safe Life" campaign sought to build practical water safety skills among the public while equipping local authorities, media outlets, and public health professionals with unified, evidence-based messaging.

"Crisis communication is an integral component of emergency response," Orabina emphasized. "Resources are often concentrated on technical logistics, infrastructure repairs, and operational continuity, while public communication—if not planned in advance—is left as an afterthought. This oversight poses direct risks to public health."

Tetiana Orabina, Deputy Director General of the Public Health Center of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine

Orabina also highlighted the practical utility of the toolkits developed during the campaign, which local authorities can integrate into their emergency response plans and crisis communication protocols.

Communication as a Pillar of Community Readiness

Rather than deploying off-the-shelf recommendations, the initiative began by examining existing public behaviors during water outages, trust dynamics regarding information sources, and critical knowledge gaps. Iryna Aheieva, Program Director at Eleos-Ukraine, outlined how these research findings were translated into practical toolkits for local authorities and the public.

Aheieva noted that communities exposed to frequent security and infrastructure disruptions have accumulated substantial operational experience. To capture these insights, the project initiated focus group research across the Derhachi, Bohodukhiv, Sumy, Konotop, Samarivka, and Pavlohrad communities. The assessment analyzed community responses to water emergencies, existing knowledge levels, trusted authorities, and remaining information gaps.

A key finding was the need to engage children directly on water safety. During the development of youth-oriented content, the team consulted child psychologists to tailor the educational formatting appropriately.

The campaign introduced three animated educational videos featuring a character named Capi, who demonstrates basic rules for safe water handling. These materials were disseminated through social media and dedicated youth communication channels.

For adult audiences, Eleos-Ukraine, in collaboration with the Public Health Center, developed 10 practical action guidelines addressing specific water-related emergency scenarios. These resources were published across partner platforms and local media outlets. Additionally, a five-part podcast series featured public health officials, technical experts, and community representatives discussing operational challenges—ranging from water quality testing and backup source management to inter-agency coordination and crisis communication.

Iryna Aheieva, Program Director at the NGO "Eleos-Ukraine"

The initiative also conducted two specialized training sessions: one for regional journalists and content creators, and another for municipal authorities.

Experts from regional Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDCs) participated in the sessions, establishing direct contact lines with media representatives for expert commentary and helping local officials simulate coordination between municipal leadership, public health specialists, and emergency responders.

According to Aheieva, a primary outcome of the campaign was the consolidation of local expert networks capable of coordinating during emergencies. The developed communication assets remain fully operational and scalable for adoption by other municipalities.

Lessons from Mykolaiv Region: Moving from Crisis Response to Systemic Readiness

During the first year of the full-scale invasion, the Mykolaiv region faced simultaneous challenges: securing alternative water sources, conducting health risk assessments, maintaining laboratory monitoring, and coordinating multiple response agencies. This experience illustrates the operational requirements that must be established before conventional municipal water networks fail.

Dmytro Makarov, Director General of the Mykolaiv Regional Center for Disease Control and Prevention of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine and Chief State Sanitary Doctor of the Mykolaiv Region, detailed the regional response effort.

"Despite an abundance of surface water bodies, the region faces a structural deficit of protected underground water sources," Makarov explained. "In fact, Mykolaiv is among the most water-scarce regions in Ukraine."

Following the destruction of the Dnipro–Mykolaiv main water pipeline in 2022, approximately 400,000 residents were left without access to centralized drinking water. Municipal authorities transitioned the system to contingency sources—initially drawing water from the Bug Estuary, and later from the Inhulets River. Concurrently, the region managed power outages, infrastructure damage, staffing shortages, and, following the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, widespread flooding.

"Today, we are in the final stages of restoring a full-scale drinking water supply for the city's residents. Throughout this crisis, the role of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention has remained clear: rigorous laboratory monitoring and expert technical support," stated the Chief State Sanitary Doctor of the Mykolaiv Region.

Water quality monitoring is executed through three complementary channels: internal quality control by the municipal water utility, state regulatory oversight, and public health monitoring conducted by the CDC. The resulting analytical data guides operational decision-making.

"Whenever water samples deviate from national sanitary standards, we immediately notify municipal leadership to jointly determine necessary restrictions, corrective actions, or alternative sourcing," Makarov noted.

Makarov stressed that a primary takeaway from the Mykolaiv experience is that formal crisis plans are insufficient on their own. Communities must conduct practical stress-tests of their operational protocols: verifying backup power generation, mobilizing response units, deploying alternative sources, and issuing timely public advisories.

"A strategy document alone yields no operational benefit. It must be drafted, formally approved, and continuously tested through practical validation," Makarov emphasized.

Continuous crisis communication represents another vital element of readiness. Makarov noted that despite the prolonged water crisis in Mykolaiv, no waterborne infectious disease outbreaks were recorded—a success he attributed to systematic public messaging and rigorous laboratory oversight.

Safety of Alternative Water Sources: From Risk Assessment to Municipal Action

The existence of a local well, borehole, or alternative supply point does not automatically guarantee that the water is safe for consumption. Following any event capable of impacting a water source, its safety profile must be reassessed. Shelling, flooding, sewer line breaches, or extended system shutdowns can compromise both physical access and microbiological or chemical safety. Nelia Novitska, Acting Director General of the Kharkiv Regional Center for Disease Control and Prevention, shared operational insights from the Kharkiv region.

"Managing decentralized water supply points and alternative sources became a primary challenge at the onset of the full-scale invasion, particularly following the de-occupation of territories. Our specialists deployed to liberated areas to conduct environmental health assessments and prevent infectious disease outbreaks. We systematically tested drinking water from available local sources—primarily shallow wells and boreholes drawing from upper aquifers that remain highly vulnerable to surface contamination," she explained.

According to data from the Kharkiv Regional CDC, the proportion of decentralized water samples failing national bacteriological standards rose from 32% prior to the escalation to 66% during active hostilities. Non-compliance based on chemical indicators increased from 46% to nearly 80%. These metrics highlight why the safety of an alternative water source cannot be evaluated visually or inferred from past use.

An alternative water source should only be approved for drinking purposes following laboratory verification. When non-compliant results were identified, technical remediation, system disinfection, and follow-up testing were performed. Sourcing was permitted to resume only after samples met sanitary standards. If water quality could not be brought into compliance, the source was formally decommissioned.

"We maintain an established protocol for notifying local self-government bodies regarding non-compliant water quality results. Annually, under state monitoring frameworks, our laboratories analyze over a thousand samples from non-centralized supply points, providing actionable technical recommendations for quality improvement," Novitska added.

Novitska noted that participating in the communication campaign prompted the CDC to refine its public outreach strategy. By shifting toward direct engagement with municipal district administrations, local news media, social channels, and community networks, the CDC enhanced the delivery of critical water quality notices to residents.

Municipalities Facing Supply Volatility: Preparedness, Resources, and Technical Solutions

For the Derhachi community in the Kharkiv region, power outages present an ongoing operational reality. In July, the municipality experienced a complete loss of electricity and centralized water service. In September, grid disruptions recurred, requiring the municipal water network to operate under emergency backup schedules. Oleksandr Turenko, Deputy Mayor of Derhachi, described the local mitigation strategy.

Since 2022, the municipality has maintained an operational framework for power loss contingencies. First, diesel generators were integrated across pumping stations, supported by a minimum 14-day fuel reserve to maintain network pressure. Second, stationary water storage tanks equipped with distribution points were established within residential areas and are replenished regularly. Third, three water filtration stations were installed in partnership with international organizations. When emergency outages occur, municipal services organize water trucking and manage public alternative supply points.

"During an emergency shutdown, updated operational schedules and water distribution protocols are immediately broadcast across public channels, including Telegram, Facebook, and Instagram," Turenko stated. "For our administration, 'safe water = safe life' is an operational workflow executed daily."

In the town of Shostka, Sumy region, centralized water supply and power were disrupted for nearly a month. However, prior investment in contingency measures enabled the municipality to maintain essential services, according to Deputy Mayor Yaroslav Schastlyvtsev.

"All pumping stations were equipped with generators backed by designated fuel reserves. Furthermore, our municipal water utility conducted real-time laboratory testing prior to system re-pressurization," Schastlyvtsev explained. "We also established structured water distribution schedules, communicating them via local media channels."

Regarding wastewater management, Shostka's central sewage pumping facility features a two-tiered redundancy system, with construction underway on a third tier. With international partner support, an off-grid power generation and storage unit is being constructed to ensure continuous wastewater processing.

Additionally, the municipality operates a 24/7 hotline where dispatchers relay verified operational updates to residents. Schastlyvtsev noted that adherence to published water supply schedules serves as a clear indicator to the public regarding system safety.

Schastlyvtsev recommends that municipalities preparing for water contingencies equip all water intake stations with modernized electrical hardware and variable frequency drives (VFDs). In addition to generators, local authorities should integrate renewable energy assets, such as solar generation, alongside multi-layered physical protection for critical infrastructure.

"Infrastructure security must be addressed long before a crisis occurs," he stressed, advising local governments to draft long-term resilience plans for municipal water, wastewater, and energy networks.

The Hirska community in the Kyiv region has pursued a systematic water security strategy since 2017. Roman Dmytriv, Head of the Hirska Village Council, explained that the initiative began with a comprehensive feasibility study to evaluate network conditions, pipeline length, and required capital investments. Following the escalation of hostilities, physical security measures were integrated into the infrastructure network.

"Every borehole facility is monitored via video surveillance. Any unauthorized entry triggers an automated alarm and dispatches a rapid response team," Dmytriv reported.

Dmytriv noted that the community faces a declining groundwater table, which compromises yield and quality in shallow wells. To address this, the municipality has prioritized the construction of centralized public water kiosks (pump rooms) featuring continuous quality monitoring.

For emergency power, the community utilizes trailer-mounted mobile generators that can be redeployed between borehole sites to maintain scheduled water delivery. Projects to install solar panels across municipal facilities are also underway.

Dmytriv further recommended establishing streamlined regulatory mechanisms to allow municipalities to store fuel reserves for backup generators more efficiently.

Hirskyi Village Head Roman Dmytriv

Translating Frontline Experience into Standard Practice

Following de-occupation, the Snihurivka community in the Mykolaiv region focused on restoring basic water utility operations before facing a second major disruption. The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam flooded local boreholes, threatening system stability.

The municipal utility company Snihurivskyi Komunalnyk was tasked with executing major network repairs while restoring system-wide operations across rural areas, reported utility director Viktor Todorov. The team had to restore access, verify water safety, diversify supply sources, and maintain service to surrounding villages.

"Following de-occupation, we replaced or installed pumps across nearly all local boreholes, replacing 18.6 km of water distribution mains and 5.4 km of sewer lines," Todorov explained. "Following the 2023 flooding, we drilled five new boreholes in Snihurivka, followed by five more the next year, while performing major overhauls and air-flushing on 11 existing wells."

In total, the community restored 39 boreholes, equipping 31 with solar array systems alongside stationary and mobile generators. Todorov noted that the municipality aims to maintain at least two operational boreholes per settlement to ensure redundancy. Water quality is monitored via regular laboratory testing, with immediate public advisories issued if parameters deviate from safety standards.

Head of the Municipal Enterprise "Snihurivskyi Komunalnyk," Viktor Todorov (online)

The Sumy Municipal Water Utility (Miskvodokanal) operates under constant security threats. During one major infrastructure incident, the utility was forced to shut down all six of its primary water intake facilities, bringing them back online incrementally following 48 hours of emergency repairs. Pavlo Novikov, Legal Counsel for the utility, outlined their operational preparedness strategy.

"We have deployed solar power units to support our water intake facilities, supplemented by gas-fired cogeneration units," Novikov explained. "By integrating three distinct energy sources, we maintain a hybrid power system capable of sustaining operations during grid failures."

The utility maintains household water storage guidelines on its website. Scheduled maintenance outages are announced in advance, while emergency disruptions are reported immediately via the official website, Telegram, and Viber channels, with local media amplifying the advisories. During extended outages, the utility deploys mobile water tankers to affected residential districts, though Novikov noted that vehicle fleets can be stretched thin during widespread emergencies.

Preparedness at the Sumy utility remains an iterative process. Every major outage is analyzed to identify operational bottlenecks, resource constraints, and communication delays. These empirical findings are incorporated into updated standard operating procedures, power distribution schemes, and public notification protocols—gradually reducing response times and mitigating consumer risk.

Because security threats continue to evolve, optimizing municipal water operations remains a continuous requirement rather than a static goal.

Pavlo Novikov, Legal Counsel at the Municipal Enterprise "Miskvodokanal" of the Sumy City Council

Water system resilience depends on more than an inventory of generators, boreholes, and treatment supplies. True resilience occurs when technical infrastructure, risk assessment protocols, inter-agency coordination, and public communication operate as an integrated system on a permanent basis. Serhiy Karelin, a water and sanitation (WASH) expert, shared key insights regarding utility crisis management during the panel.

"Water crises exhibit common patterns: destruction of intake sources, power grid failures, network breaches, supply chain disruptions for chemicals, staffing shortages, and budget constraints," Karelin noted. "The primary requirement for an operational response plan is to establish clear water allocation priorities and maintain strategic reserves."

Karelin emphasized the need for redundant communication channels, ensuring local authorities can maintain operational coordination if primary telecom networks fail.

He also highlighted the technical value of installing variable frequency drives (VFDs), which reduce the required generator capacity and fuel consumption. For supplementary power, he advocated for integrated renewable solutions combining solar and wind generation assets.

Additionally, establishing localized water storage and efficient distribution hubs remains critical. Engaging major retail supermarket chains in urban areas can help decentralize water distribution and alleviate logistical pressure on municipal water utilities during emergency operations.

The full recording of the public discussion can be viewed за посиланням.

The community experiences presented during the discussion demonstrate that crisis preparedness cannot rely on a single technical contingency. Municipalities require diversified water sources, backup power infrastructure, material reserves, regular laboratory oversight, clear operational command structures, and validated response protocols.

Equally critical is the pre-deployment of crisis communication strategies: informing residents where to access safe water, how to treat water following system restoration, and where to receive official operational updates.

This integrated logic guided the "Security Scenarios: Safe Water = Safe Life" campaign—progressing from behavioral research to standardized response scenarios, municipal training, and operational coordination with public health agencies. The toolkits tested within these pilot communities are now available for broader adoption, equipping local governments across Ukraine to build resilience before the next crisis occurs.

This public discussion was made possible through the generous support of the American people funded by the U.S. Department of State. The contents are the responsibility of the EpiC project and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of State.

EpiC is a global cooperative agreement (7200AA19CA00002) led by FHI 360 with core partners Right to Care, Palladium International, and Population Services International (PSI).